Broadly, scientists think about how well a belief is supported by looking at its justifying evidence, whereas the antivaxxers decide on the conclusion often based on what they believe about their children and then bend or reject any evidence to fit the mould.
Over the last few months, the soul searching over the shortcomings of fMRI brain scanning has escaped the backrooms of imaging labs and has hit the mainstream. Numerous articles in hard hitting publications have questioned some common assumptions behind the technology, suggesting a backlash against the bright lights of brain scanning is in full swing.
A study published last year in neurology journal Brain re-examined these experiences by deliberately triggering them by electrically stimulating the brain. The participants were all patients with epilepsy who were having neurosurgery to treat their otherwise untreatable seizures and the researchers, led by neurologist Jean-Pierre Vignal, specifically stimulated areas in the mesial [inner] temporal lobes.
I've just discovered this fantastic 1990 study from The Lancet that investigated near death experiences reported by patients. However, it did something quite different from most other studies - it actually checked to see whether the patients were actually near death or not - and many of them weren't.
What's interesting in this debate as many scientists respond by simply denying there is a problem and suggesting that this is just a issue of progress and eventually we will be able to explain every mind state in terms of brain function.
This week's Nature has a fascinating essay by anthropologist Pascal Boyer discussing the quirks of spiritual belief and how they may result from the evolution of our mind and brain.
Psychology Today journalist Matthew Hutson covers some fascinating experiments just published in this week's Science that found that reducing participants' control increase the tendency for magical thinking and the perception of illusory meaning in random or patternless visual scenes.
The mainstream approach to cognition holds that it happens in the mind and that material culture is nothing more than an outgrowth of our mental capacities. Archaeologist Lambros Malafouris is challenging this deep-seated idea with a radical new notion: the hypothesis of extended mind, which posits that material culture is not a reflection of the human mind but an actual part of it.
It reminded me of an early book by Derren Brown, an English magician who has a similar pitch. Brown is better known for his more recent TV shows and books, but some of his early publications are fascinating because they not only discuss his approach, but also shed light on our increasingly psychology-focused culture.
While musing over yesterday's post on the use of psychological language as a form of a magician's misdirection, I remembered Dennett's 2003 article [pdf] on consciousness where he uses exactly this as a metaphor for why consciousness doesn't exist as some scientists think it does. Dennett argues that the 'hard problem' is a red herring - the whole question of how conscious first person experience arises from the biological function of the brain assumes that consciousness is a single thing that needs explaining.
This week's ABC Radio National's All in the Mind discusses what happens in the brain during out of body experiences, and why actions can be accurate even when our perceptions are not.
Philosopher Eric Schwitzgebel has written an excellent piece on experimental philosophy, the practice of testing out philosophical ideas by using experiments or gathering data.
The article looks at how the self has been related to our ability to make narratives out of the disconnected events in our lives, and particularly focuses on the theories of philosophers Alasdair MacIntyre and Paul Ricoeur.
High-end talking shop, TED, has a couple of video lectures on 'memes' - the supposedly self-contained units of information, ideas or actions that replicate through human culture and are selected by a process akin to natural selection.
Neuromythology is the shibboleth of cognitive science that the mind is a machine, and that somehow our theories of information, complexity, patterns or representations are sufficient to explain consciousness. Tallis accuses cognitive scientists, and philosophers of cognitive science such as Chalmers, Churchland and Dennett, of the careless use of words which can apply both to thinking and to non-thinking systems ('computing', 'goals', 'memory', for example). This obfuscation "provides a framework within which the real problems can be by-passed and the illusion of progress maintained".
This week's Nature has a feature article on how a new breed of computational linguists are attempting to understand the evolution of language by using high powered computer models. The traditionalists are not impressed, and accuse the new school of reducing language to numbers and oversimplifying to the point of meaninglessness.
Phantom limbs are a well-known phenomenon where sensations and feelings are still experienced from a missing limb. In rare cases after brain injury, an additional phantom limb can appear - causing the sensation of a phantom third hand, arm or leg.
The CIA have released the full text of a book on the psychology of analysing surveillance data. While aimed at the CIA's analysts, it's also a great general guide on how to understand complex situations and avoid our natural cognitive biases in reasoning.
This month's Trends in Cognitive Sciences has a fantastic review article on the neuroscience of meditation - focusing on how the contemplative practice alters and sharpens the brain's attention systems.
ABC Radio National's The Philosopher's Zone recently broadcast a programme that tackled the philosophy of translating between languages - discussing whether particular ideas are just harder to express in certain languages, and whether it is possible ever to tie a word to a definite meaning.
In other words, the reason we've developed thinking brains is to allow us to act, and so the possibilities, limitations and feedback from actions must shape our psychology - both in the long term as a species (via evolution) and in the short term as individuals (via learning and plasticity).
The letters page of this week's New Scientist contains a lively debate about the neuroscience of free will, inspired by neuropsychologist Chris Frith's recent article on the topic
Infants seem unable to 'think to themselves' and instead 'talk to themselves' when solving problems, usually vocalising the most tricky or novel aspects of the situation. As we grow, we develop the ability to internalise this speech, and can eventually have a purely internal monologue.
Interesting entry about an interview with Tim Crane and an overview of the classic mind/body problem.
Patients who have delusion experiences which then create post-traumatic stress syndromes. So the traumatic event was a mental event, not an actual event.
Excellent entry on Edward Bernays who used Freud's ideas to sell product. Links to a documentary and NPR piece as well.
An earlier article discussing the 'disassociation' patients have during various medical procedures.
Science has just published two short papers where researchers induced a touch sensation that that seemed to be felt in a 'fake' body that appeared to be several metres in front - similar to an 'out-of-body-experience'.
Yang put some of his success down to his training in psychology, but do psychologists make better poker players? There's no direct evidence that they do, despite what they might try to tell you at the table, but some research suggests they might have an advantage in a few of the key skills.
Showing something just before or just after a briefly presented picture is known as 'masking' and helps to ensure that after it appears, the picture doesn't stay in iconic memory - a very brief 'after-image' memory that extends our visual experience after something has gone.
An entry in Mind Hacks about the difference between attention and consciousness.
